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GENE PATENTS AND THE PRODUCT OF NATURE DOCTRINE
JOHN M. CONLEY*
INTRODUCTION
Michael Crichton is not the first person to be shocked and appalled by
gene patents. Indeed, it seems to be a standard reaction among almost eve-
ryone but patent lawyers. In an extreme version of this reaction, Congress-
man Xavier Becerra of California has introduced a bill that would virtually
ban new gene patents.I While the bill probably has little or no chance of
passage in anything like its present form, 2 its introduction is symptomatic
of an unease with current patent law and practice that is both wide and
deep. Scientists, economists, and law professors worry about the impact of
gene patents on future biotechnology research. 3 Ethicists lament the appar-
ent commodification of human tissues, especially when others make money
* William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law. A.B., Har-
vard; J.D., Ph.D., Duke. I thank Corrine Belt for her excellent research assistance.
1. Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007). The bill would add a
new § 106 to the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006), which would provide: "Notwithstand-
ing any other provision of law, no patent may be obtained for a nucleotide sequence, or its functions or
correlations, or the naturally occurring products it specifies." H.R. 977 § 2(a). For Congressman Xavier
Becerra's statement in support of the bill see Congressman Xavier Becerra, H.R. 977, The Genomic
Research and Accessibility Act: Common Sense Legislation That Will End the Practice of Gene Patent-
ing, http://becerra.house.gov/HoR/CA3 I/Issues/genepatents.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2009).
2. The bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property on March 1, 2007, and no further action has been reported.
3. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews et al., When Patents Threaten Science, 314 SCIENCE 1395, 1395-96
(2006) (arguing against using patents to preempt laws and products of nature); Lori B. Andrews, Genes
and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights, 3 NATURE REVIEWS: GENETICS 803, 803-
05 (2002) (addressing the negative impact gene patenting may have on research, medical treatments,
and disease diagnosis); Andrew Chin, Research in the Shadow of DNA Patents, 87 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 846, 848 (2005) (arguing that DNA patents inhibit research involving oligo-
nucleotides); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of
DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783 (2000) (presenting an early and authoritative effort to raise such
questions); Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology's Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 318, 327-31 (2006) (reviewing biotechnology industry's perspective on the
practical impact of current patent law); Peter Yun-hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discov-
ery: Applying Common Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain Patents on Biotechnology
Research Tools, 19 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 79, 83-86 (2005) (reviewing empirical research on topic). For a
thorough overview of the topic, see ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS,
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
without compensating the donors of those tissues.4 Legal academics (far
more than practicing patent lawyers, who seem comfortable with the situa-
tion)5 worry about fidelity to long-established patent law principles. 6 And
people of all backgrounds seem to share Representative Becerra's visceral
reaction that patenting genes just is not right.7
Any number of gene patent examples might serve to bring these di-
verse objections into focus, but the one that may do it best is the so-called
breast cancer gene patent. Issued to Mark H. Skolnick and several Univer-
sity of Utah colleagues in 1998 and assigned to Myriad Genetics, Inc.
(Skolnick's company), the patent "relates to methods and materials used to
isolate and detect a human breast and ovarian cancer predisposing gene
(BRCAl), some mutant alleles of which cause susceptibility to cancer."'8
The broadest of twenty allowed claims-the operative parts of the patent,
which define specifically what is patented and what others may not do-
covers "an isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide... having the
amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2 [a listed amino acid se-
quence]." 9 The allowance of this claim means that Myriad Genetics can
exclude anyone else from making, using, or selling the breast cancer gene
outside the body. (This is what "isolated" means.)10 One obvious conse-
4. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990) (Arabian, J.,
concurring) (decrying the treatment of "the human vessel ... as equal with the basest commercial
commodity."); Leon R. Kass, Triumph or Tragedy? The Moral Meaning of Genetic Technology, 45 AM.
J. JURIS. 1, 5 (2000) (responding to "breast cancer gene" patent discussed infra notes 49-51 and accom-
panying text); Kara H. Ching, Note, Indigenous Self-Determination in an Age of Genetic Patenting:
Recognizing an Emerging Human Rights Norm, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 687, 701-02 (1997) (discussing
these issues in context of a patent on a cell line derived from a tribe in Papua New Guinea).
5. See, e.g., Symposium, The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and the Law: The American
Legal System's Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 371, 377 (2002)
(argument by former patent commissioner defending the legal status quo).
6. Recent examples of the vast genre include Andrew Chin, Artful Prior Art and the Quality of
DNA Patents, 57 ALA. L. REV. 975 (2006); Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the
Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 303 (2002); Eileen M Kane, Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 519 (2006); Eileen M Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71
TENN. L. REV. 707 (2004); Peter Fox, Comment, It's Not Over for the Product of Nature Doctrine Until
the Synthetic Super-Heavy Element ("SHE") Sings, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1005 (2006).
7. See John M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of
Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (pts. I & 11), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'¥ 301, 371 (2003) (reviewing common-sense objections).
8. U.S. Patent No.5,747,282, at [57] (filed June 7, 1995).
9. Id. claim 1.
10. The relevant definition reads as follows:
"Isolated" or "substantially pure". An "isolated" or "substantially pure" nucleic acid (e.g., an
RNA, DNA or a mixed polymer) is one which is substantially separated from other cellular
components which naturally accompany a native human sequence or protein, e.g., ribosomes,
polymerases, many other human genome sequences and proteins. The term embraces a nucle-
ic acid sequence or protein which has been removed from its naturally occurring environment,
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quence is that doctors wishing to test patients and their families for the
presence of the cancer-predisposing form of the gene must obtain a license
from Myriad and must persuade the patients' insurance companies to pay
for that license. But because U.S. patent law lacks a meaningful research or
experimental exception, "l anyone wishing to do research on the gene out-
side the body must also obtain a license.12 Moreover, because the patent
claim covers any and all DNA sequences that code for the BRCA1 protein,
if multiple genes are found to perform this function, Myriad will control all
of them for the twenty-year life of its patent.
A patent such as this evokes a strong response from just about every
category of skeptics, whether their particular focus is the foreclosure of
research, the potential denial of healthcare, or the proper application of the
patent laws. It is also likely to trigger an elemental response that lies at the
core of almost every objection: You should not be able to patent a gene!
This paper will focus on the latter point, restating it as a question of
legal doctrine: Why is it that the law has routinely treated genes as patenta-
ble inventions rather than unpatentable natural phenomena? Part I of this
article will review the basics of patent law, with particular emphasis on
patentable subject matter and the long-established product of nature doc-
trine. Part II will discuss the understanding of genetics that is reflected in
the patent case law, an understanding that has led the courts and the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to find a material distinction
between genes as usually claimed in patent applications and their naturally-
occurring counterparts. Part III will review several recent legal develop-
ments that, taken together, may portend some future constraints on the
virtually unfettered patentability that genes have enjoyed thus far. Finally, I
will conclude with some thoughts on the policy implications of these de-
velopments.
and includes recombinant or cloned DNA isolates and chemically synthesized analogs or ana-
logs biologically synthesized by heterologous systems.
Id. col.19 11.8-18.
11. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that experimen-
tal exception is extremely narrow, and not applicable to work of research university); Lee, supra note 3,
at 86-87 (reviewing narrowing of research exception).
12. See Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 6, at 416-17 ("The University of Pennsylvania has
curtailed much of its genetic research from fear of patent infringement, and at least one Yale University
researcher has been forced to withdraw from breast cancer research to avoid infringing license limita-
tions on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes patented by Myriad.").
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I. A BRIEF REVIEW OF PATENT LAW
A patent is a right to exclude: specifically, the right to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the patented invention for twenty years from
the date of issue. 13 The infringer's intent is irrelevant. Whereas copyright
law requires proof of copying, 14 inadvertent duplication constitutes patent
infringement. The authority to grant patents is provided in the Constitution:
Congress is authorized "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 15 As this language
suggests, the American patent system has an economic rationale, with the
government offering a broad exclusionary right as an incentive to inven-
tion. The Patent Act further seeks to promote scientific progress by condi-
tioning the grant of the patent on full disclosure of the relevant
technology. 16
The basic requirements for obtaining a patent are set forth in §§ 101,
102, 103, and 112 of the Patent Act of 1952.17 Section 101 specifies two
distinct requirements. First, the application must claim the sort of thing on
which a patent may be granted; in other words, it must claim patentable or
"statutory" subject matter. That category is very broad, encompassing
claims by anyone who "invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof."' 18 As the Supreme Court most famously put it, the
realm of patentable subject matter includes "anything under the sun that is
made by man."' 19 Nonetheless, the category is not all-encompassing. As far
back as 1889, the Patent Office recognized that it would be wrong "for an
element or a principle to be secured by patent," lest patents might "be ob-
tained upon the trees of the forest and the plants of the earth."' 20 Almost a
century later, the Supreme Court reiterated that "laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable subject matter. 21 The
reason is that "such discoveries are 'manifestations of ... nature, free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none.' 22
13. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), 271(a) (2006).
14. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), 501(a) (2006).
15. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
16. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (stating the enabling disclosure requirement).
17. Id. §§ 101-03,112.
18. Id. § 101.
19. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citations omitted).
20. Exparte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 123, 125-126 (1889).
21. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
22. Id. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
(Vol 84:1I
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This longstanding prohibition against patenting "physical phenomena"
or "manifestations of nature" is often referred to as the "product of nature"
doctrine. Although its precise theoretical roots are somewhat murky and
still debated, the fundamental point is that the mere discovery of a naturally
occurring phenomenon is not patentable because it is not an invention. As
the Supreme Court stated in its most recent pronouncement on the subject,
"'the relevant distinction' for purposes of § 101 is . . . 'between products of
nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.' 23
Second, § 101, by using the word "useful," imposes a utility require-
ment. 24 In the vast majority of cases, it is easily met. As Justice Story wrote
in 1817, "[a]ll that the law requires is, that the invention should not be fri-
volous or injurious to the well-being, good policy or sound morals of socie-
ty."' 25 The utility requirement has presented a formidable barrier to only
two categories of patents: so-called chemical intermediates and genes. In
the former category, the Supreme Court has rejected a claim "to a chemical
process which yields an already known product whose utility-other than
as a possible object of scientific inquiry-has not yet been evidenced. '26
The typical gene patent claims a gene that codes for a known protein and
the utility standard is readily met. However, as I will discuss below, the
logic of the chemical intermediate rule has been applied to defeat claims to
gene fragments whose ultimate function is not known and whose only
present value is as a research tool. 27
Section 102 requires that the claimed invention be novel. 28 "Novelty"
has a highly technical meaning that is articulated (albeit not very clearly) in
§ 102's complex provisions. For example, under § 102(a), the patent will
be denied if the invention was known or used by others in this country,
patented here or abroad, or described in a "printed publication" in the Unit-
ed States or a foreign country prior to the patent applicant's date of inven-
tion.29 Section 102(b) creates the "statutory bar" that results in a forfeiture
of patent rights if the applicant or anyone else makes public use of the in-
vention, puts it on sale, or engages in other specified conduct more than a
year prior to the filing of the application. 30 Section 102(g) establishes the
23. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 134 (2001) (quoting
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
25. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) (Story, J.).
26. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529 (1966).
27. See discussion infra Part III.B.
28. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
29. Id. § 102(a).
30. Id. § 102(b).
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rules for determining priority when two or more inventors claim the same
invention. 31 American priority rules are virtually unique in international
patent law: priority is usually awarded to the person who can prove that he
or she was the first to invent, whereas in most other countries the patent
goes to the first person to file an application.
The final substantive requirement is "nonobviousness." As set forth in
§ 103(a), the specific rule is that the invention is unpatentable
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and
the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 32
The nonobviousness barrier will sometimes trip up applicants who have
survived the § 102 novelty inquiry. Under the novelty test, the patent will
not be denied unless the very invention that is now claimed has been de-
scribed, used, etc. in its entirety before the critical date. 33 Under the non-
obviousness rule, by contrast, the patent will be denied if a hypothetical
person of ordinary skill in the field, armed with the total knowledge of the
field then available to the public (the "prior art"), would have looked at the
claimed advance at the time it was invented and deemed it an obvious
step.34 To date, the nonobviousness requirement has had little impact on
gene patents. In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has gone so far as to hold that a claim to an isolated and purified
gene (that is, cDNA) is not rendered obvious by prior art that discloses both
a method of gene cloning and the partial amino acid sequence of a protein
closely related to that produced by the claimed gene. 35 Nonetheless, there
have been some recent hints that nonobviousness may be preparing for a
comeback. 36
Assuming that these four substantive standards can be satisfied, the
application itself must meet certain formal requirements. The most impor-
tant of these is § 112's "enablement" rule, which is meant to enforce the
disclosure part of the patent bargain.37 The patent application must describe
the invention with enough specificity to enable a person skilled in the rele-
31. Id. § 102(g).
32. Id. § 103(a).
33. See Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that anticipation requires that "each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either
expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.").
34. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740 (2007) (Supreme Court's most
recent restatement of obviousness doctrine, discussed infra text accompanying notes 112-115).
35. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
36. See discussion infra Part III.C.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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vant field to make and use it. It is not necessary for the inventor actually to
have built the invention before filing the application; it is enough that the
description provided in the application will enable someone else to build it.
Meeting the enabling disclosure requirement also proves that the applicant
is actually in possession of the invention.38
II. WHY ARE GENE PATENTS NOT BARRED BY THE PRODUCT OF NATURE
DOCTRINE?
To understand the answer to this question, one must begin with Di-
amond v. Chakrabarty,39 the Supreme Court's only biotechnology case.
Chakrabarty had altered an existing species of bacteria by inserting new
DNA rings, called plasmids. The result was a genetically new species with
enhanced oil-consuming properties. In a five-to-four decision (it is often
forgotten just how close this case was), the Court held that the new species
of bacteria was patentable subject matter, notwithstanding that it was alive.
Although the specific facts of the case did not involve claims to genes
themselves, the Court's broadly-worded discussion of the boundary be-
tween unpatentable natural phenomena and patentable human-made inven-
tions remains the standard for applying the product of nature doctrine. 40
Of greater direct relevance is the Federal Circuit's 1991 decision in
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,41 which may still be that
court's most significant biotechnology case. In Amgen, three companies
fought over the patent rights to the DNA sequences that encode the human
erythropoietin (EPO) protein, which stimulates the production of red blood
cells. 42 The broadest of the Amgen product claims that was upheld by the
Federal Circuit reads as follows: "A purified and isolated DNA sequence
consisting essentially of a DNA sequence encoding human erythropoie-
tin."' 43 Amgen, in other words, claimed the purified and isolated form of
38. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating
dual purpose of § 112). Providing an enabling disclosure of a biotechnology invention can sometimes
be problematic. See id. at 964-65 (holding that, in case of DNA patent, § 112 requirement may be
satisfied by depositing sample of claimed composition in public depository).
39. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23. For recent general discussions of the product of
nature doctrine, see Andrews et al., supra note 3; Chin, supra note 6, at 986; Stephanie Arcuri, Note,
They Call That Natural? An Analysis of the Term "Naturally Occurring " and the Application of Genes
to the Patent Act, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 743, 757-60 (2006); Fox, supra note 6, at 1012.
41. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
42. Because it enhances the blood's ability to carry oxygen, EPO has played a prominent role in
many sports doping scandals. For example, the 1996 Tour de France winner, Bjame Riis of Denmark,
has recently admitted that he used EPO that year. See Associated Press, Riis Admits Doping During
1996 Tour Victory, NBC SPORTS, May 25, 2007, http://nbcsports.msnbc.comid/18864080/.
43. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1204 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008 (filed Nov. 30, 1984)).
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any gene that codes for the EPO protein. As used in the Amgen patent,
"purified and isolated" meant that the coding region of the relevant DNA
had been identified and had been reproduced outside its natural environ-
ment.
That Amgen's patent was directed to statutory subject matter was tak-
en for granted and not at issue in the case. However, the Federal Circuit did
take pains to point out why this was the case: "It is important to recognize
that neither [competing inventor] invented EPO or the EPO gene. The sub-
ject matter... was the novel purified and isolated sequence which codes
for EPO .... ,"44 The district court emphasized the same point, characteriz-
ing human EPO as "a nonpatentable natural phenomenon 'free to all men
and reserved exclusively to none.' 45
Thus, by 1991, the Federal Circuit had acquiesced in the proposition
that the words "purified and isolated" were sufficient to distinguish a
claimed gene from its naturally occurring counterpart. And it had done so
in the context of an extraordinarily broad claim that covers the purified and
isolated version of any gene that codes for the vitally important human
EPO protein. But what did these qualifying words actually mean? As is
clear from a reading of the patent itself, as well as from the district court's
extended discussion, the essence of Amgen's invention was "the successful
cloning of the EPO gene."'46
A clone, or cDNA version of a naturally-occurring gene, differs from
the naturally-occurring variant in that the introns, or noncoding regions, are
absent.47 This is because cDNA is synthesized by reverse-transcribing
messenger RNA (mRNA). mRNA is itself the product of the complete
transcription of one strand of an entire active gene, followed by the splicing
out of the noncoding regions. Accordingly, the gene claimed in Amgen
does not have a precise structural counterpart in the human body. On the
one hand, it lacks the noncoding regions that are part of naturally-occurring
DNA. And, on the other hand, while cDNA is a faithful reverse transcrip-
tion of the sequence recorded by the mRNA, it is DNA, not RNA, and thus
a different chemical. 48 The acceptance of this fundamental distinction by
the courts and the USPTO has underlain all subsequent gene patenting.
44. Id. at 1206.
45. Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1759 (D. Mass. 1989) (quoting
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
46. Id.
47. For a more detailed review of the science of DNA patents, see Conley & Makowski, supra
note 7, at 309-16.
48. Most importantly, RNA substitutes the base uracil for the thymine that is present in DNA. See
id. at 311.
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The power of this distinction is illustrated even more vividly by the
Skolnick breast cancer gene patent. 49 Making ingenious use of a variety of
known techniques, as well as detailed family medical histories available in
Utah, the inventors were able to identify the sequence of base pairs that
codes for the protein for which the human BRCA1 gene codes. This dis-
covery led to the first and broadest of the allowed claims: "An isolated
DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide [protein], said polypeptide having
the amino acid sequence set forth in [an appended listing]."' 50 In other
words, a patent was granted on an isolated DNA sequence (note the ab-
sence of the further modifier "purified") that codes for a protein that is
made up of the specified sequence of amino acids.
The only thing that distinguishes the claimed sequence from se-
quences in living human cells that code for the same protein is the word
"isolated." According to the definition provided in the patent, "isolated" is
a synonym for "substantially pure. ' 51 These equivalent terms denote a
"nucleic acid.. which is substantially separated from other cellular com-
ponents which naturally accompany a native human sequence." In other
words, "isolated" "embraces a nucleic acid sequence.., which has been
removed from its naturally occurring environment. '52 The chemical differ-
ence between the claimed sequence and the comparable sequence that ac-
tually occurs in the human body is that the "isolated" sequence does not
include any noncoding DNA. Nonetheless, what emerges is a patent on a
DNA sequence that is defined by the fact that it does exactly the same cod-
ing work as the human BRCA1 gene. This claim perhaps represents the
gene patent in its most sweeping form.
"Isolated" continues to work its magic, sometimes in combination
with "purified" and/or "synthesized." Several recently-issued patents illu-
strate the point. For example, a patent issued to Callaghan et al., in 2006
and entitled "Human Tumor Suppressor Gene" 53 claims "[a]n isolated
nucleic acid comprising a nucleotide sequence selected from the group
consisting of' five different nucleotide sequences-two defined by specific
nucleotide listings and the other three by the amino acids or proteins for
which they code. 54 According to the abstract, the claimed gene "appears to
represent a tumour [sic] suppressor gene and the detection of a polymor-
phism or alteration in the gene from a subject may be useful for the diagno-
49. U.S. Patent No.5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995). See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
50. Id. claim 1.
51. See supra note 10 for a full definition of "isolated."
52. U.S. Patent No.5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995), col.19 11.8-18.
53. U.S. Patent No. 7,105,652 (filed May 16, 2002).
54. Id. claim 1.
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sis or determination of a predisposition to hyperproliferative disease such
as a cancer."' 55 It is clear from the body of the patent, however, that the
exact function of the gene is not yet known. The assumption that it has a
tumor suppressing function is based on the protein it codes for having a
similar amino acid sequence to a fruit fly protein which is, in turn, similar
to a family of rat proteins that help to mark cells for degradation and death.
Another 2006 patent, this one issued to Ikawa et al., and entitled
"Human p51 Genes and Gene Products Thereof," 56 claims "[a]n isolated
DNA molecule comprising a nucleotide sequence coding for a polypeptide
comprising" a listed sequence of amino acids. 57 The p51 gene is believed
to be a member of the p54 family of known tumor suppressor genes. The
evidence for actual tumor-suppressing activity is stronger than in the Cal-
laghan patent; that evidence includes p5I's involvement in cell growth
inhibitory activity and the presence of a suspect mutation in human tumor
tissues.
In both of these patents, "isolated" appears to have its everyday mean-
ing. While the Amgen meaning of "with noncoding regions absent" is at
least implicit in patents such as these, it is no more than that. Andrew Chin
has described the current state of claiming practice as follows:
The claim terms "isolated" and "purified" typically do not refer to an ab-
solutely homogeneous condition but more broadly encompass mixtures
in which biological substances and large molecules other than the
claimed DNA molecule are substantially absent. To give a typical exam-
ple, a patent issued in 1998 to Chiron Corporation ... states that a DNA
molecule is "purified" if it "is present in the substantial absence of other
biological macromolecules ... " while a DNA molecule is "isolated" if
it is "separated not only from other [DNA molecules] that are present in
the natural source of the macromolecule but also from other macromole-
cules." Thus, a DNA molecule excised from a living cell and stored in a
saline solution, with no other DNA present, would be "isolated" and "pu-
rified" within the meaning of the patent claim. 58
"Isolated" has become an equally powerful word in the realm of pro-
tein patents, often serving as the only distinction between a claimed protein
and its naturally occurring counterpart. For example, a patent issued to
Turley et al., in 2002, entitled "Hyaluronan Receptor Protein," relates to "a
novel hyaluronan receptor protein involved in cell locomotion or motility
and in cell proliferation and transformation and to DNA sequences encod-
55. Id. at [57].
56. U.S. Patent No. 7,132,276 (filed Mar. 24, 1999).
57. Id. claim 1.
58. Chin, supra note 6, at 986-87 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,731,427 (filed May 10, 1995)).
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ing this protein." 59 Significantly, "[t]hese receptors regulate cell locomo-
tion and have been implicated in malignant transformation. '60 The broadest
of the three claims is directed simply to "[a]n isolated protein comprising
the amino acid sequence of FIG. 2."61 Following the same strategy, a pa-
tent issued to Kikuchi et al., in 2006 claims "[a]n isolated gastric cancer
antigen protein which comprises [the listed] amino acid sequence. ' 62 An
alternative claim is directed to "an isolated protein" that is encoded by a
specified DNA sequence.63 The significance of the invention is that the
protein in question can stimulate the immune cells of the body to kill can-
cer cells. Given the language of the claims, the patent would control any
research on the antigen protein, whether defined by its amino acid sequence
or the nucleotide sequence of the gene that codes for it.
To summarize, Amgen ratified the proposition that claiming genes in
isolated or purified form "is not simply a lawyer's trick."' 64 Interpreting the
limitations "isolated" and "purified" in the gene-cloning context of that
case, both Amgen courts accepted the prevailing assumption in patent law
that a gene that is effectively claimed in cDNA form is materially different
on a structural level from its natural precursor.
There are two problems with this assumption, however. First, as
should be evident from the recent patents just discussed, the thinking re-
flected in Amgen has given rise to one of those slippery slopes of which
lawyers are so fond. A reader of Amgen may or may not be persuaded by
the materiality of the DNA/cDNA distinction. Nonetheless, it was a distinc-
tion and thus promised to circumscribe gene patents and limit their preclu-
sive effect on future research. But now, as Chin points out, "isolated" has
come to mean nothing more than, well, isolated. 65 We are faced with a
proliferation of patents that create proprietary rights in genes and proteins
whenever they are used outside the chemical media in which they naturally
occur. To make matters worse, genes are successfully defined both in terms
of their sequences and the proteins they encode, while proteins are defined
both by the amino acids that comprise them and the DNA sequences that
encode them. As a practical matter, has the line between natural phenome-
non and human-made invention been obliterated?
59. U.S. Patent No, 6,429,291, at [57] (filed June 7, 1995).
60. Id. col.1 11.27-28.
61. Id. claim 1.
62. U.S. Patent No. 7,030,222 claim I (filed July 10, 2002).
63. Id. claim 2.
64. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 786.
65. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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A second problem involves the exclusive focus on structural distinc-
tions between natural and human-made genes. There is no doubt that isola-
tion produces, at least in literal terms, a difference in chemical structure.
The isolated gene or protein is no longer the same physical entity as its
natural precursor. But, as all of the patents I have discussed make clear, the
entire utility of the claimed isolate lies in the fact that it is functionally in-
distinguishable from the natural version. 66 Thus, the breast cancer or tumor
suppressor gene patents claim DNA sequences that are defined by the fact
that they do exactly the same coding work as the versions that occur in the
body. The function of a gene is to carry information that can be used to
make a protein. The isolated versions carry the same information-indeed,
they are of interest to science only because they do.
Patent lawyers have succeeded in making the chemical structure of
genes the sole focus of the patentable subject matter analysis. It is not clear,
however, why this should be so. In determining whether a claimed gene is a
natural phenomenon or a human-made invention, why should a small struc-
tural difference be dispositive, while functional identity-which is the
whole point of the patent-is entirely irrelevant? Perhaps it really was a
lawyer's trick after all.
III. ARE THERE ANY LIMITS IN SIGHT?
There is no direct evidence of any tightening of the patentable subject
matter rules. As the recent patents discussed in the Introduction suggest, it
is business as usual at the USPTO. Nor have any court decisions struck
down gene or protein patents on subject matter grounds. There are, howev-
er, some indirect hints that change may be in the air.
A. Patentable Subject Matter
The most significant of these hints was the Supreme Court's near-miss
on patentable subject matter in 2006 in the case of Laboratory Corp. of
America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.67 The case involved:
[A] patent that claims a process for helping to diagnose deficiencies of
two vitamins, folate and cobalamin. The process consists of using any
66. See Kane, Splitting the Gene, supra note 6, at 745-56 (suggesting that, when viewed from a
functional perspective, the genetic code might be viewed as a law of nature); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual
Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 835
(1999) (attacking Federal Circuit's categorization of DNA-based technology as just another species of
chemistry).
67. 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006). For a useful review of this case, see Cynthia M. Ho, Lessons from
Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 463 (2007).
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test (whether patented or unpatented) to measure the level in a body fluid
of an amino acid called homocysteine and then noticing whether its level
is elevated above the norm; if so, a vitamin deficiency is likely. 68
The trial court and the Federal Circuit held that the patent was valid and
that Laboratory Corporation of America ("LabCorp") was liable for induc-
ing infringement when it encouraged doctors to order diagnostic tests for
measuring homocysteine. 69
Although LabCorp vigorously defended the case on a number of
grounds, including that the patent was invalid for being overbroad and in-
definite, it never raised the issue of patentable subject matter in any explicit
way in the lower courts. 70 However, in its successful petition for certiorari,
LabCorp raised the following question:
Whether a method patent [setting forth an indefinite, undescribed and
nonenabling step] directing a party simply to 'correlate' test results can
validly claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship [used in
medical treatment] such that any doctor necessarily infringes the patent
merely by thinking about the relationship after looking at a test result. 71
Thus, at least four Justices-the minimum number necessary to grant certi-
orari-seemed to have a strong interest in revisiting the product of nature
doctrine's first cousin, the longstanding prohibition against patenting "laws
of nature."' 72 Then, in a move that was as startling as its original grant of
cert, the Court dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. 73 Its one-
sentence per curiam order gave no clue as to what had happened. But, in a
strong dissent from the dismissal, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens
and Souter, gave some hints as to what the four or more who had wanted to
take the case had been thinking.
The dissent began by reciting the longstanding exclusion from patent
protection for "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. ' 74
According to Justice Breyer, the exclusion has nothing to do with the rela-
tive ease or difficulty of discovering the laws of nature, or the ultimate
utility of such discoveries. The exclusion is, rather, based in the Constitu-
tion: allowing such patents would be to grant more protection than is ne-
cessary to "promote the progress of science and the useful arts."'75 Justice
68. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2921 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2925 ("LabCorp did not refer in the lower courts to § 101 of the Patent Act, which sets
forth subject matter that is patentable, and within the bounds of which the 'law of nature' principle most
comfortably fits.").
71. Id. at 2925 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
72. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
73. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2921.
74. Id. at 2922 (citation omitted).
75. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
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Breyer characterized the patentable subject matter rules (including the pro-
hibition against patenting phenomena of nature) as an effort "to sail be-
tween [the] opposing and risky shoals' 76  of overprotection and
underprotection, to balance "'the enormous potential for rent-seeking that
would be created if property rights could be obtained in [those basic prin-
ciples] and ... the enormous transaction costs that would be imposed on
would-be users.' 77
After a detailed description of the invention at issue and its impact on
medical practice, and a thorough review of the "laws of nature" case law,
Justice Breyer reached the tentative conclusion that "[a]t most, [the paten-
tees] have simply described the natural law at issue in the abstract patent
language of a 'process.' 78 Regardless of whether he was right or wrong,
he concluded, the case presented a significant opportunity for the Court to
clarify "whether the patent system, as currently administered and enforced,
adequately reflects the 'careful balance' that 'the federal patent
laws... embod[y].' ' 79
So the three dissenting justices saw in Lab. Corp. an important oppor-
tunity to ask whether the current application of the patentable subject mat-
ter requirement is providing more protection than is necessary to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts. The case dealt specifically with
the "laws of nature" exclusion. Nonetheless, a majority opinion along the
lines of Justice Breyer's dissent may well have invited a similar rethinking
of the product of nature exclusion, with particular focus on its impact on
science. One can envision an argument in the Federal Circuit, or perhaps
the Supreme Court itself, about whether the USPTO's exclusive reliance on
small structural differences between natural and isolated genes is promot-
ing or inhibiting the progress of science. Those of us who would like to
participate in that argument can only hope that the Supreme Court will be
confronted with another case in which the issue of patentable subject matter
is more squarely presented.
A further hint that change may be on the horizon has come from the
Federal Circuit's 2005 decision in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2923 (quoting WILLIAM M LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305-06 (2003)).
78. Id. at 2928.
79. Id. at 2929 (citations omitted). Interestingly, Justice Breyer all but repudiated the Federal
Circuit's holding in State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), that a software-based accounting process comprised patentable subject matter as long as it
produced a "useful, concrete, and tangible result." According to Justice Breyer, "this Court has never
made such a statement and, if taken literally, the statement would cover instances where this Court has
held the contrary." Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2928.
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Corp.80 The question in the case was whether Apotex's generic drug com-
pound paroxetine hydrochloride anhydrate (PHC anhydrate) would infringe
SmithKline's patent on another form of PHC, PHC hemihydrate. 81 The two
compounds are crystals; PHC hemihydrate includes bound water mole-
cules, whereas PHC anhydrate does not. SmithKline uses PHC hemihydrate
as the active ingredient in the antidepressant drug Paxil. When Apotex
sought regulatory approval for a generic antidepressant that contained PHC
anhydrate, SmithKline sued for infringement of the hemihydrate patent. 82
SmithKline did not claim that its hemihydrate patent covered the an-
hydrate form. In fact, PHC anhydrate had been the subject of an earlier,
now-expired patent, and had thus been part of the prior art for the PHC
hemihydrate application. 83 SmithKline alleged, however, that Apotex's
PHC anhydrate tablets convert naturally into PHC hemihydrate-including
upon ingestion by the patient-thus "making" the patented compound. 84
The district court ruled for Apotex, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, al-
though on different grounds.8 5 It found that, because PHC anhydrate did
indeed convert naturally into PHC hemihydrate, PHC anhydrate "inherently
anticipated" the hemihydrate compound.8 6 Under § 102(b), the Federal
Circuit held, the prior art included all chemicals that were patented or de-
scribed in a printed publication more than one year prior to SmithKline's
application for the hemihydrate patent, and any compounds that were inhe-
rent in those prior art chemicals, regardless of whether their inherency was
fully understood prior to the critical date.87
As interesting as the inherency issue is, the critical part of the case for
the gene patent story is the concurring opinion of Judge Gajarsa. He would
have affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Apotex on the
ground that the claim in question encompassed unpatentable subject mat-
ter.88 Judge Gajarsa reviewed the discovery of the paroxetine compounds
and their properties at great length, beginning with the original research on
80. 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
81. Id. at 1333-34.
82. Id. at 1334.
83. Id. at 1334-35, 1343.
84. Id. at 1335-36, 1346.
85. Id. at 1333-34. Based on a claim construction that the Federal Circuit held to be erroneous, the
district court had found that there was no infringement. The Federal Circuit ruled that, although a
proper claim construction would have led to a finding of infringement, the SmithKline patent was
anticipated and thus invalid. Id.
86. Id. at 1346.
87. Id. at 1343. As the court noted, the leading case on inherency is Schering Corp. v. Geneva
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
88. SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1347 (Garjarsa, J., concurring).
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the anhydrate form in the 1970s. 89 He then focused on SmithKline's unli-
mited, four-word claim to "crystallized paroxetine hydrochloride hemihy-
drate" 90 and the necessary implication that that claim represented an
assertion of rights in "all 'crystallized paroxetine hydrochloride hemihy-
drate,' without any exceptions." 91
For Judge Gajarsa, the key fact was that:
[A]t some point, likely in late 1984, something occurred in SmithKline's
laboratories that gave rise to two new phenomena simultaneously. The
first was a synthetic crystal later named paroxetine hemihydrate, ostensi-
bly a patentable human-made invention under Chakrabarty. The second
was a natural physical process whereby paroxetine anhydrate (a pre-
existing synthetic crystal that is today in the public domain) could, under
normal climatic conditions and with no human intervention, bond with
water molecules and convert itself into paroxetine hemihydrate, ostensi-
bly an unpatentable, newly-discovered natural process under Chakrabar-
ty.92
The result was an invention that "blur[red] the line between a natural
process and a synthetic product .... [A] synthetic compound, created by
humans in a laboratory, never before existing in nature, that is nevertheless
capable of 'reproducing' itself through a natural process."' 93 In an elaborate
hypothetical, Judge Gajarsa analogized to genetically modified corn that
was blown by the wind from the field of a single farmer all across the con-
tinent. He concluded that the notion that the patent holder would be entitled
to collect royalties from every farmer whose field contained even a few
patented stalks "cannot possibly be correct."' 94 The problem, in his view,
was "the inevitable failure of the patent to provide public notice-which, in
turn, stems from the inherently unpatentable nature of the claimed subject
matter."'95 In other words, if a patent claims-without limitation-a prod-
uct that can result from natural processes beyond the intent or control of a
would-be infringer, then that patent cannot fulfill its public notice function.
In such circumstances, Judge Gajarsa concluded, its subject matter must be
deemed unpatentable.
Judge Gajarsa's two final points are also noteworthy. First, he stated
emphatically that claimed subject matter that falls into both the "nonnatu-
rally-occurring" and "found in nature" categories is not patentable under §
89. Id. at 1347-50.
90. Id. at 1350.
91. Id. at 1352.
92. Id. at 1360 (citations omitted).
93. Id. (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 1361.
95. Id.
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101.96 And second, he observed that "[m]erely limiting the claim to 'syn-
thetic PHC hemihydrate' would have solved the problem. But SmithKline
Beecham did not."'97
It is unclear what, if anything, Judge Gajarsa's concurrence portends
for the law of gene patents. It is, of course, merely a concurrence, without
the force of law. Indeed, his two panel colleagues (Judges Rader and Bry-
son) reacted dismissively. In two short (and, to this reader, unpersuasive)
paragraphs, they accused him of confusing subject matter eligibility with
the separate question of the scope of the claims: "The scope of the claims is
not relevant to subject matter eligibility. Subject matter does not take on a
different eligibility status with adjustments in the scope of the proposed
claim."'98 The apparent import of this statement is that, in the majority's
view, a human-made compound cannot be rendered unpatentable merely
because the claim could also read on a naturally-occurring variant.
In my judgment, Judge Gajarsa has the better argument. How can it be
irrelevant to subject matter status that a patent unambiguously claims natu-
rally-occurring subject matter? Would Chakrabarty have won if he had
claimed-again, without limitation-an organism that was produced in
nature, as well as in his laboratory?
Even if Judge Gajarsa is right, however, his objection may not extend
to gene patents. He was concerned that SmithKline's claim covered both
the human-made and naturally-occurring versions of PHC hemihydrate,
and that these were the very same compounds. As he emphasized, Smith-
Kline could have resolved his objection simply by limiting its claim to
"synthetic PHC hemihydrate," but did not do so. Going back at least to
Amgen, gene patent claimants have been careful to limit their claims to
nonnaturally-occurring genes, using the modifiers "synthesized," "iso-
lated," and/or "purified." Transposing Judge Gajarsa's objection into the
gene context, limiting a claim to "synthesized" or "purified" would surely
be sufficient to satisfy him, and "isolated" almost certainly would do the
job as well. The literal structural identity that so troubled him in SmithKline
simply is not present.
Nonetheless, it does seem newsworthy that, in the mind of at least one
Federal Circuit judge, the product of nature doctrine is alive and well as a
barrier to patentability that is still to be taken seriously. Perhaps the court
can someday be persuaded to take a close look at whether the meager struc-
96. Id. at 1362.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1342.
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tural dissimilarity between claimed genes and their natural counterparts is a
sufficient distinction in the light of their complete functional identity. 99
B. Utility
In another important 2005 case, In re Fisher, the Federal Circuit in-
voked the seldom mentioned utility requirement to strike down patents on
expressed sequence tags (ESTs). 100 As the court described it, "[a]n EST is
a short nucleotide sequence that represents a fragment of a cDNA
clone."' 0 ' cDNA is derived from the reverse transcription of mRNA, which
is itself based on the transcription of a gene that is being expressed (that is,
in the process of coding for a protein). When an EST is introduced into a
mixture of DNA, it may hybridize (its single strand binding to its comple-
ment) with a portion of the DNA. If that happens, it is then possible to con-
clude that the DNA is part of a gene. Fisher claimed ESTs derived from
cDNA that had been obtained from maize leaf tissue. He therefore asserted
that the ESTs he claimed corresponded to genes that were expressed in that
tissue. However, he did not know either the precise structure or function of
the genes being expressed or the proteins that they encoded. 102 Rather, he
disclosed a variety of uses in genetic research. 103
Citing Brenner v. Manson, 104 the Supreme Court's chemical interme-
diate case, the Federal Circuit held that a claimed invention must have a
"substantial" and "specific" utility, with the former requiring a "significant
and presently available benefit to the public" and the latter "a well-defined
and particular benefit to the public." 105 Noting that "the facts here are simi-
lar to those in Brenner,"106 the court held that Fisher's asserted utilities fell
well short of the Brenner standard. None of Fisher's asserted uses was
either substantial or specific, because all "represent merely hypothetical
99. Additional evidence of the Federal Circuit's growing interest in the question of patentable
subject matter can be found in three recent cases involving inventions that comprise mental processes.
See In re Bilski, 545 F. 3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding that method for managing the con-
sumption risk costs of a commodity sold at a fixed price does not comprise patentable subject matter,
because it is a non-transformative process that encompasses merely mental steps); In re Comiskey, 499
F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that mental processes for resolving a legal dispute by the
decision of a human arbitrator are not patentable subject matter); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that encoded signals are not patentable subject matter).
100. 421 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
101. Id. at 1367. See also Conley & Makowski, supra note 7, at 315-16 (describing the biology of
ESTs).
102. Fisher, 421 F.3dat 1368.
103. Id.
104. 383 U.S. 519 (1966). See supra text accompanying note 26.
105. Fisher, 421 F.3dat 1371.
106. Id. at 1374.
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possibilities, objectives which the claimed ESTs, or any EST for that mat-
ter, could possibly achieve, but none for which they have been used in the
real world."' 107 Moreover, "any EST transcribed from any gene in the ma-
ize genome has the potential to perform any one of the alleged uses."'1 08 As
in Brenner, the claimed substances were useful only "as an object of use-
testing;"109 in this case, in the identification of genes that encode unknown
proteins of unknown function. As in Brenner, this was simply not enough
to meet the standard of "specific benefit... in currently available
form .... ",110
The holding in Fisher will not, of course, impose any limits on the pa-
tenting of genes whose protein-encoding structure is currently known.
Nonetheless, gene-patent skeptics were heartened by the fact that the Fed-
eral Circuit had taken a stand against the seemingly unfettered expansion of
the biotechnology patent portfolio. Moreover, the result was not foreor-
dained, as evidenced by Judge Rader's strong dissent."'I At a minimum,
one can say that the court is paying attention-at least at the margins.
C. Obviousness
A final hint about the future involves the doctrine of obviousness. In
its April 2007 decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 112 a case
that involved an automobile gas pedal assembly, the Supreme Court made
it somewhat easier to defeat a patent on obviousness grounds. The specific
question was whether the combined teachings of multiple prior art refer-
ences rendered the applicant's invention obvious. The Federal Circuit held
that, for an invention to be found obvious, the prior art must contain some
"teaching, suggestion, or motivation" to combine the references in the way
that the applicant did (the "TSM test"). 13 Finding the "rigid approach of
the Court of Appeals" inconsistent with its own "expansive and flexible
approach," ' 1 4 the Supreme Court reversed. Instead, "a court can take ac-
count of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would employ." 115 Thus freed from the necessity of finding specific
evidence in the prior art to satisfy the TSM test, the USPTO and the courts
107. Id. at 1373.
108. Id. at 1374.
109. Id. (quoting Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535). See supra text accompanying note 26.
110. Id. at 1371 (quoting Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535).
111. Id. at 1379 (Rader, J., dissenting).
112. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
113. Id. at 1734.
114. Id. at 1739.
115. Id. at 1741.
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presumably will have more freedom to reject patents that are borderline
obvious.
The early evidence from biotechnology suggests that this is exactly
what is happening. In one of its first post-KSR cases, PharmaStem Thera-
peutics Inc. v. ViaCel Inc., 116 the Federal Circuit held that two patents on
the collection, preservation, and use of stem cells from umbilical cord
blood were invalid for obviousness. The court found that "it was reasonable
for the inventors of the patent, like the authors of the prior art references, to
infer the presence of high concentrations of stem cells in cord blood, even
though the prior art studies did not offer conclusive proof."" 17 Citing KSR,
the court characterized the inventors' contribution as "[s]cientific confirma-
tion of what was already believed to be true'-"a valuable contribution,
but it does not give rise to a patentable invention." 11 8
A 2007 decision of the USPTO's Board of Patent Appeals and Interfe-
rences suggests the potential impact of KSR on gene patents specifically. In
Exparte Kubin, 119 the Board upheld an examiner's section 103 rejection of
claims covering a cDNA molecule that encodes "natural killer" proteins
that are part of the body's defenses against infection. Given related prior art
patents and publications, the Board held, the skilled practitioner would
have found it "obvious to try" to isolate the cDNA in question; accordingly,
the invention was "the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and
common sense." 120 Under KSR, it held, this was enough to show obvious-
ness. Significantly, the Board did not believe that In re Deue 21 (which
had held that the obviousness of a general method of isolating cDNA was
irrelevant to the obviousness of a particular claimed cDNA molecule) was
controlling "given the increased level of skill in the art and factual differ-
116. 491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
117. Id. at 1363.
118. Id. at 1363-64.
119. No. 2007-0819, 2007 WL 2070495, at *1 (B.P.A.I. 2007). See Board Finds that cDNA Se-
quence Was "Obvious to Try" Under KSR, 74 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 350 (2007).
Kubin was argued in the Federal Circuit on January 8, 2009. See Federal Circuit Considers "Obvious to
Try" Arguments in Biotechnology Patenting, 77 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 267
(2009). Even more recently, on February 6, 2009, the Federal Circuit heard oral arguments on whether a
method for using a naturally-occurring gene regulation protein to treat disease comprises patentable
subject matter. The case appealed from is Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 529 F. Supp.
2d 106 (D. Mass. 2006). The oral argument is described in Enablement, Preempting Laws of Nature
Key Issues in Ariad v. Lily Oral Arguments, 77 BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 360 (2009).
120. Exparte Kubin, No. 2007-0819, 2007 WL 2070495, at *5.
121. 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). See supra text accompanying note 35.
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ences." 122 It seems reasonable to ask whether the evolving "level of skill in
the art" will jeopardize a broad range of existing and future cDNA patents.
Finally, the aggressive use of the obviousness doctrine briefly threat-
ened some of the most famous-or infamous, depending on one's point of
view-patents in the whole biotechnology realm. Since 1998, the Universi-
ty of Wisconsin has received a series of patents on embryonic stem cell
lines. 123 The purpose of a cell line is to extend the natural life of a living
cell for research purposes-as biologists sometimes describe it, "to immor-
talize the cell."124 Cells are first taken directly from an organism and then
grown in an artificial medium, or culture. When these cell cultures can be
induced to grow for substantially longer than normal, they are referred to as
cell lines.
James A. Thomson of Wisconsin is widely credited with having been
the first to culture human embryonic stem cells. The broadest of the Wis-
consin patents claims a "purified preparation of primate embryonic stem
cells" which have several characteristics, including a life expectancy of
more than one year, the same genetic composition as the parent species,
and pluripotency, or the potential to "differentiat[e] [in]to derivatives [of]
endoderm, mesoderm, [or] ectoderm [tissues]"-that is, the ability to turn
into any kind of cell. 125 Stated in these terms, this claim would appear to
encompass any primate stem cell line.
According to news reports in the spring of 2007, the USPTO was
reexamining three WARF patents at the behest of two public domain advo-
cacy foundations and had made a preliminary determination of invalidi-
ty. 12 6 The initial determination of invalidity was reportedly based on the
122. Ex parte Kubin, No. 2007-0819, 2007 WL 2070495, at *7; Board Finds that cDNA Sequence
Was "Obvious to Try" Under KSR, 74 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 350, 351 (Jul. 20,
2007).
123. See Andrew Pollack, 3 Patents on Stem Cells Are Revoked in Initial Review, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
3, 2007, at C2; Joyce E. Cutler, PTO Overturns Stem Cell Patents Granted to Wisconsin Research
Foundation, 73 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 678 (2007).
124. See Conley & Makowski, supra note 7, at 316-18 (describing the biology of cell lines).
125. U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 col.4 11.8-13 (filed June 26, 1998).
126. See Pollack, supra note 123. Under 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2006), "[a]ny person at any time may
cite to the Office in writing prior art consisting of patents or printed publications which that person
believes to have a bearing" on any patent. Section 302 then provides that "[any person at any time may
file a request for reexamination by the Office of any claim .... " on the basis of prior art cited under
§ 301. The final decision is appealable by the patent holder but not the challenger. Separately, pursuant
to 35 U.S.C. § 31 l(a), "[a]ny third-party requester at any time may file a request for interpartes reex-
amination by the Office of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited .... " Both patentee and challen-
ger have rights of appeal. Id. § 315. The procedure is rarely used, however. On the one hand, the
requester has limited procedural rights, but on the other, the reexamination will have a strong preclusive
effect against the requestor in any subsequent infringement action. Reexamination of two of the WARF
patents-including the '806 Patent cited in the text-was sought under § 302, while a third was reex-
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fact that Thompson's cells "appeared to be the same as, or obvious varia-
tions of, cells described in earlier scientific papers or in patents issued to
others."' 127 KSR would presumably lend more weight to this position. How-
ever, in final decisions issued this past spring, the USPTO upheld all three
patents. 128 An appeal by the challengers is possible in the case of one of the
three patents, but the other two decisions are final 129. Despite the outcome,
it is worth noting that those who interpret and apply the patent law-from
the Supreme Court down to the examiner level-are responding, albeit in a
preliminary and tentative way, to the widespread and growing concern
about the heretofore inexorable expansion of the biotechnology patent
realm.
CONCLUSION: WHY GENE PATENTS MATTER
The tangible impact of gene patents on scientific progress and eco-
nomic development continues to be hotly debated. Critics warn of the
threat posed by the creation of a "patent thicket" or "patent anticom-
mons" 130 that would make it intolerably inefficient to obtain all the licenses
necessary to do research. A particular concern has been "the increasing
tendency for biomedical researchers to patent upstream inventions, i.e.,
research tools and inputs used to conduct basic research and development,
as opposed to the products of research and development."' 13 1 A related
issue is that which was central to both Brenner132 and Fisher: 133 the risk
that broad, upstream, and early patents create rights of presently unknown
scope and significance. 134 In other words, when we grant a patent on a
gene, we usually do so with only very incomplete knowledge of what that
gene does in the body.
amined under § 311(a). See Joe Vanden Plas, Patent Office Upholds Remaining WARF Stem Cell
Patents, WTN NEWS, Mar. 11, 2008, http://www.wistechnology.com/articles/4601.
127. Pollack, supra note 123.
128. See Vanden Plas, supra note 126.
129. As reported in supra note 126, the two reexaminations conducted under § 302 cannot be
appealed by the challenger, whereas the one conducted under § 31 l(a) can be. News reports quote one
of the challengers as planning to appeal. See Vanden Plas, supra note 126.
130. E.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-
commons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-
Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289,295 (2003).
131. Holman, supra note 3, at 329-30.
132. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966); see supra text accompanying notes 26, 104-111.
133. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see supra text accompanying notes 100-111.
134. See Kane, Splitting the Gene, supra note 6, at 719 ("One concern is the specter of a patent
issuing where the metes and bounds are unclear due to the underdeveloped state of the invention-in
other words, an uncertain scope, and possible lack of enablement or written description, or both.").
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Not everyone agrees with this assessment. As Christopher Holman has
argued, if a patent thicket problem were impeding research, "one might
expect that organizations representing the interests of biotechnology...
would be advocating for reforms."' 135 But he finds instead that "these
groups tend to be among the most adamant defenders of the status quo and
strong patent rights." 136
The empirical evidence for the effect of biotechnology patents on re-
search is mixed. 137 Chin, for example, has built an elegant mathematical
case that oligonucleotide patents impede downstream research. 138 Similar-
ly, a survey of laboratory physicians found that almost half "reported not
developing a test because of the fees associated with it."' 139 Yet a 2005
National Academy of Sciences survey of more than 1,500 academic and
industry researchers found that none of the respondents had ever stopped a
project because of conflicting patent rights, and only a handful had expe-
rienced any material delays. 140 By the same token, there are numerous
individual reports of clinical physicians avoiding tests or treatments be-
cause of patents and associated licensing fees, 141 but it is unclear just how
widespread this problem is. Overall, as Linda Demaine and Aaron Fellmeth
have concluded, "[t]here has been no conclusive empirical study to support
one or the other viewpoint."' 142
Even in the absence of compelling empirical evidence, I remain con-
cerned. Such concern is new for me: for most of my thirty years as an intel-
lectual property lawyer, I have not worried much about shifting tides in
legal doctrine. In the early 1980s, I represented the successful plaintiff in
one of the first-generation software copyright cases 143 that resulted in ex-
pansive protection for the "look and feel" of a program. 144 Many observers
expected software progress to grind to a halt. 145 Then, in 1992, Computer
135. Holman, supra note 3, at 330.
136. Id.
137. See Lee, supra note 3, at 84-85 (reviewing conflicting evidence).
138. See Chin, supra note 3.
139. Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 6, at 416.
140. See Holman, supra note 3, at 330 (reporting results of NAS survey). Some of the research
underlying this negative conclusion can be criticized on the grounds of sample size and representative-
ness.
141. See Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 6, at 416 (citing reports by Dorothy Nelkin and Lori
Andrews).
142. Id. at414.
143. SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 817 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
144. For a review of these cases written at the time of maximum copyright protection, see John M.
Conley, Look and Feel: In Defense of the Current Case Law, COMPUTER LAW., Dec. 1988, at 1.
145. See id. at 5-6 (quoting prediction that "consumers will be forced to continue paying exorbitant
prices for business software developed by industry leaders.").
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Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. dramatically reduced the scope
of copyright protection. 146 Many observers expected software progress to
grind to a halt. 147 But neither doctrinal trend had any discernible impact on
the industry; aided by a nimble licensing community and a flagrant, often
flamboyant disregard for the law, it has continued to chum out more, better,
and cheaper software. Similar unfulfilled apocalyptic prophesies attended
the proliferation of software and business method patents. 148 The technolo-
gy sector has long seemed the embodiment of the Coase Theorem: "while
'the delimitation of rights is an essential prelude to market transac-
tions ... the ultimate result (which maximizes the value of production) is
independent of the legal decision.' ' 149 In other words, given a market
without transaction costs, the participants will arrive at the most efficient
outcomes regardless of the content of legal rules.
But I fear that genes may be different. Based more on instinct than
evidence, I share Brenner's concern about granting patents of unknown and
unknowable scope. Every year, we seem to hear more about the multiplici-
ty of tasks that our relatively few genes perform. With each year's hind-
sight, last year's understanding of how genes work looks incomplete and
primitive. This, in my judgment, should make us increasingly cautious
about granting exclusivity in any gene. I hope that the recent legal devel-
opments I have reviewed portend at least a slowing of the rush to monopol-
ize the genome.
146. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
147. See generally Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Structure, 64
BROOK. L. REV. 519, 520 (1998) (reviewing Computer Associates and its contribution to "the bumpy
road to a coherent system of intellectual property protection for computer software").
148. In April 2003, for example, concern about the impact of such patents led the Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta to convene a conference on "Business Method Patents and Financial Services," in
which I participated. The conference proceedings are summarized in Clifford S. Stanford, Business
Method Patents and Financial Services, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV, Fourth Quarter 2003, at
V.
149. R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 158 (1988).
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